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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
GILBERT N. ANDERSON and
ELLA B. ANDERSON,
Plaintiffs and Respondents
Case No. 9,854

vs.
E VAL ANDERSON
Defendant and Appellant

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE: This is an
action originally pleaded as an action to enforce a forfeiture of a real estate contract which was submitted
at the time of trial by stipulation on the question of
law as to whether or not the contract violated the rule
against perpetuities.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT: The case
was tried to the Court and from a judgment for the
Plaintiff declaring the contract void as a violation of
the rule against perpetuities the Defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL: Defendant seeks
a reversal of the judgment as a matter of law and a
judgment holding said contract to be valid.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

THE FACTS: Plaintiffs as sellers and Defendant
as buyer entered into a real estate contract for the sale
of a farm, (Exhibit "A") on the 15th day of January,
1959. Pursuant to the contract Defendant took possession of the land and farmed the same continuoualy to
the date of the filing of the action. The contract price
was $26,564.00 with 4¥2% interest payable in annual
installments of not less than $1,000.00. Defendant paid
$500,00 on May 1, 1959; $500.00 on December 1, 1959;
$1,000.00 on October 1, 1960 and $1,000.00 on October
1, 1961. The minimum payment did not cover the interest. The buyer has an option to accellerate payments.
Plaintiffs filed their complaint on August 1, 1962
claiming that Defendant had defaulted under the contract by failing to make the payments required under
the contract and asked the Court's assistance to enforce a forfeiture of the contract. At the trial the
Plaintiffs changed their approach and rather than
claiming a forfeiture asked the Court to declare the
contract null and void as a ·violation of the rule against
perpetuities. Plaintiffs stipulated that Defendants had
paid all that was required b~T the contract but claimed
that the contract which Plaintiffs counsel had prepared
waf' nevertheless void.
The effect of the contract is ba3ically that the
yearly payments provided fall short of pa~Ting the interP~t on the principal. If the miniinuin pay1nents were
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3
made the Defendant would be entitled to possession and
the profits from the land perpetually but the contract
would not be paid out unless the buyer exercised his
option to pay sufficiently more on the principal so
that the payments would more than cover the interest.
POINT: THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE CONTRACT IN QUESTION WAS VOID
BECAUSE IT VIOLATED THE RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES :-Both parties stipulated that the
only issue was one of law, to wit: Does the contract violate the rule against perpetuities? There is no issue under
the pleadings as to whether the contract as it reads
violated the intent of the parties. We must therefore
proceed on the basis that the parties intended the contract to have the effect it did; that the parties intended
that the contract principal would never be paid unless
Defendant exercised his option to pay more than the
minimum and that the parties intended that the buyer
should have the possession and profits as long as he
paid $1,000.00 a year and otherwise abided by the terms
of the contract.

It may well be that if the respondents had claimed
that the contract violated the intent of the parties they
might have pursued a remedy of reformation. We must
conclude that Plaintiffs had their own good reasons
for not pursuing such a remedy. The result might
have been a reduction of the interest rate, or some other
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4
result consistant with the presumption of construction
against a party preparing a contract. In this respect,
it should be noted that it was the appellant and not the
respondent that attempted to broaden the issue to include possible reformation. (Page 22 O.R. lines 7 to 10)
But we face solely the issue of the violation of the rule
against perpetuities.
The document, when viewed according to its classification as to legal effect is in essence a lease in perpetuity with an option to buy rather than a typical real
estate contract because of the following incidents: The
buyer or lessee has possession and right to income
while he is current on his payments but legal title would
always remain in the seller or lessor unless the buyer
or lessee exercises his option to pay additional amounts.
The rule aganist perpetuities as its applies to this
situation is as follows in -!1 American Jurisprudence: 50.
''The rule against perpetuities prohibits the creation of future interests or estates which by possibility may not becon1e vested with a life or
lives in being at the effective date of the instrument, and twenty-one years thereafter ...
"It's usual application and effect is to prohibit
or invalidate atten1pts to create by limitations.
whether executorv or hv wav of remainder,
future interests o~ estate;, the .vesting of which
is postponed he~~ond the prescribed period."
(Emphasis supplied).
It is well settled that perpetual leases do not viol-
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5
ate the rule against perpetuities. The earliest collection of cases available on the question of the effect of
the rule on perpetual leases is found in 3 ALR 498,
which states as follows:
"Save in a single instance (1\forrison v. Rossignol-Cal.-infra), it has been generally held that
perpetual leases and leases containing a covenant
for perpetual renewal are not violative either
of the rule against perpetuities or of statute;:;
limiting the period during which the absolute
power of alienation may be suspended.''
"The reason why a lease containing a covenant
for perpetual renewal does not contravene the
rule against perpetuities is that the covenant
to renew may be taken as part of the lessee';~
present interest. ''The rule again3t perpetuities,''
says Professor Gray (Perpetuities Section 230),
''although a strict rule, is yet a practical rule.
An estate for years with a perpetual covenant
for renewal is, so far a's questions of remotene~~
are concerned, substantially a fee, and as such
it is regarded."
''And it is obvious that a perpetual lease, or a
lease containing a covenant for perpetual renewal is not a restraint or limitation upon tlH'
power of alienation of the fee, for there are at all
times persons in being who by ;joining ran r:onrey
the fee."
''A lease for any number of years, whethPr for
99 or 999 is not in violation of the Statute of
Perpetuities for in neither is the lessor precluded
thereby from dispo3ing of it at will nor the lP~~PP
hindered in selling or assigning the lease; and hv
uniting in a conveyance the lessor and lesse.e
may freely and without restraint convey both
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6
the fee and leasehold interest.'' (Emphasis supplied)
The most recent annotation available is found in
66 ALR 2nd 733 at page 734 Section 3 the pertinent
part of which is as follows:
''In regard to whether or not a perpetual lease,
or a covenant to renew a lease perpetually, violates the rule against perpetuities, or any rule
against suspension of the power of alienation,
see the annotation in 3 ALR 498, supplemented
in 162 ALR 1147.
Clearly, a lease in praesenti for a term to commence at once does not violate the rule against
perpetuities, whether or not the lease term will
continue for a time beyond the period allowed
by such rule for the vesting of interests."
Said annotation quoting cases reiterates the test as
follows:
''So in Re Hubbel (1907) 135 Iowa 637, 113 NW
152 ,13 LRA NS 496, 14 ANN Cas 640, the Court
declared, upon the authority of the Todhunter
Case (Iowa supra, that a lease for any number
of years, whether for 99 or 999, 'is not in violation of the statute of perpetuities,' since the le~
sor is not precluded thereby from disposing of
the land at will, nor is the lessee hindered in
selling or assigning the lease, and moreover, by
uniting in a conveyance the lessor and le::;st>e
may freely and without restraining convey both
the fee and leasehold interest."
The only remaining question, is whether the option
to buy, which might be exercised anytime during tlH~
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period of the lease, violates the rule. It is conceded
that an option, unconnected with any present interest
or a lease may, depending upon its provisions, violates
the rule. But the authorities are in harmony that where
such option is not in gross but is in connection with
some present interest and right to immediate possession,
the mere fact that an option to buy is attached to such
present interest will not render the document in violation of the rule. I quote from 41 Am J ur 85 as follows :
''Where the option to purchase is contained in a
lease giving the lessee an option to purchase during the term of the lease, the eourts take the
view that the rule against perpetuities does not
apply.''
The following is from Leach and Tudor, The Rule
Against Perpetuities; Page 145, Section 24.57:
"In the Fnited States an option to purchase in
a lease exereisable during or at the end of the
tenant's term is valid, regardless of the length
of the lease, aecording to cases which are supported by Professional opinion. Gray thought
otherwise, favoring the English cases which holfl
such an option void if exercisable beyond the
period of perpetuities.
Options in a tenant to renew or extend his 1Pa~P,
even options of perpetual renewal; are not invalid under the rule against perpetuities an~·
where, ineluding England, but options of renewal may run afoul of statutes which put a time
limit on the permissable duration of leases, e.g.
as in California, ninety-nine years on urban
leases and sixteen on agricultural leases.
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Critique. The situation considered in this section is the exact opposite of that in the previous
section. (Options in a person other than a tenant). Improvement of the land is stimulated,
not retarded, by the existance of an option to
purchase in the tenant. If the tenant has an option to purchase, he can safely improve, for by
the exercise of the option he can preserve to himself the benefit of the improvement. If he has
no option, he cannot economically make an improvement which will have a substantial value
at the termination of the lease. Thus, a ru]e
which invalidates an option in a tenant for the
full term of his lease defeats the policy favoring free alienation and full use of property which
the rule against perpetuities was designed to
further. The American cases which exempt from
the Rule Options in a tenant to purchase or to
renew are sound.''
The following is from Simes, Future Interests, Section 110; page 381 :
''The question has also been raised whether or
not an option inserted in a lease permitting the
lessee to buy reversions during the term is valid,
even though it may be exercised at a time beyond
the period of the rule. It would seem that this
provision is just as much a commercial device
as the option to renew the long term lease and
should be held valid for the same reason. This
is the conclusion reached bY the .A1nerican Decisions; but the English Courts have treated
this option like any other option to purchase
and have held it subject to the rule.''
There is no basis in the law for holding that the
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CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that
the District Court should be reversed
declared valid and the defendant be
state himself under said contract and
ant be awarded his costs herein.

the judgment of
and the contract
allowed to reinthat the defend-

Respectfully submitted
DAINES, THOMAS AND HODGES
By David R. Daines
Attorneys for Appellant
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